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Abstract 
There  are  several  services  that  build  on  the  availability  of  closest  node  location  information  like 
geographic routing in spontaneous networks, data gathering in sensor networks, movement coordination among 
autonomous  robotic  nodes,  location  specific  services  for  hand  held  devices  and  danger  warning  or  traffic 
monitoring in vehicular networks. Ad hoc networking protocols and location-aware services require that mobile 
nodes identify the location of their closest nodes. Such a process can be easily misuses or stop by opposed 
nodes.  In  absence  of  a  priori  trusted  nodes,  the  spotting  and  identifying  of  closest  node  position  presents 
challenges that have been scarcely investigated in the literature. Node can also send message from one to many 
nodes in a broadcasting manner here.  
Index Terms: Closest Nodes, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Phantom Nodes, Position identification, Vehicular 
Networks. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Location  details  has  become      an      important 
asset  in  mobile  systems,  where  a  wide    range    of 
protocols and  applications require knowledge of the 
position  of  the  participating  nodes.    Geographic 
routing  in    impetuous  networks,  data  gathering    in   
sensor   networks,  movement  coordination among 
autonomous robotic nodes,  location-specific services 
for   handheld  devices,   and   danger  warning  or   
traffic monitoring  in   vehicular  networks  are   all   
examples   of services  that  build  on the  availability 
of closest node location information. 
The    correctness    of    node      locations      is  
therefore an  all- important issue in mobile  networks, 
and  it becomes particularly  challenging  in   the   
presence    of    adversaries  aiming  at    harming  the  
system. In  these   cases,  we  need solutions that  let 
nodes  1) correctly  establish their  location in  spite  
of attacks  feeding  false  location  information, and 
2) verify  the  positions of  their  neighbors, so  as  to  
detect adversarial nodes  announcing false locations. 
This  system  focus    on  the    latter    aspect,  
hereinafter  referred  to  as  closest  node  location 
identification (NPV  for short). Specifically, we deal 
with  a  mobile  ad  hoc  network,  where  a  pervasive 
infrastructure  is  not  present,  and  the  location  data 
must      be  obtained  through  node-to-node 
communication.  Such  a  scenario  is  of  particular 
interest since it leaves the door open for adversarial 
nodes to misuse or stop the location-based services.  
For  example,  by  advertising  forged  positions, 
adversaries  could  bias  geographic  routing  or  data 
gathering processes, attracting network  traffic   and   
then  eavesdropping  or  discarding  it.  Similarly, 
counterfeit  positions  could  grant  adversaries 
unauthorized  access  to  location-dependent  services,   
let  vehicles      forfeit      road      tolls,  stop  vehicular 
traffic or endanger passengers and drivers.  
A fully  distributed, lightweight NPV  procedure  
that      enables      each      node      to      acquire    the   
locations advertised by  its  neighbors, and  assess  
their  truthfulness. We   therefore propose an   NPV   
protocol that     has   the following features: 
.  It  is  designed  for    impetuous  ad  hoc 
environments, and,  as  such,  it does  not  rely  
on  the  presence of a trusted infrastructure or of 
a priori trustworthy nodes; 
.  It leverages cooperation but   allows   a   node   
to  perform  all  identification  procedures 
autonomously. This approach has  no need  for 
lengthy interactions, e.g.,  to  reach  a  consensus 
among  multiple  nodes,  making  our  scheme  
suitable  for  both    low-  and    high-  mobility 
environments; 
.  It is reactive, meaning that it can be executed by 
any  node,  at  any  point  in  time,  without  prior 
knowledge of the neighborhood; 
.  It is robust against independent and   colluding 
adversaries; 
.    It  is  lightweight,  as  it  generates  low  overhead   
traffic.  
Additionally, our  NPV scheme  is compatible 
with  state-of- the-art security architectures, including 
the  ones  that  have been   proposed  for   vehicular  
networks    [1],    [2],    which  represent  a  likely 
deployment  environment  for  NPV.The  rest    of  the 
project  is  organized  as  follows:In  Section2,  we  
review  previous works, highlighting the  novelty  of 
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our  solution. In Section  3, we  describe the  system 
model,  while    the  communication  protocol,  the 
objectives  of the identification procedure  and  our  
main    results  are    outlined  in    Section      4.    The   
details      of    the      NPV      protocol    and      of 
identification tests  are  then presented in  Section5, 
Finally, we provide a performance evaluation of the 
protocol in a vehicular scenario  in Section 6, and  
draw conclusions in  Section. 
 
2.RELATEDWORK 
Although  the   literature  carries   a  multitude  
of  ad   hoc security protocols addressing a number of 
problems related to NPV, there  are  no lightweight, 
robust  solutions  to  NPV  that  can  operate 
autonomously in an open,  ephemeral environment, 
without  relying    on  trusted  nodes.    Below,  we  list 
relevant  works  and    highlight  the  novelty  of  our 
contribution. For  clarity   of  presentation, we  first  
review  solutions  to    some    NPV-related  problems, 
such  as  secure positioning  and   secure   discovery,  
and      then      we    discuss  solutions  specifically 
addressing NPV. Securely determining own location. 
In  mobile  environments,  self-localization  is  mainly 
achieved  through  Global  Navigation  Satellite 
Systems,    e.g.,  GPS,  whose    security  can  be   
provided  by   cryptographic  and   no cryptographic 
defense  mechanisms  [3].  Alternatively,  terrestrial  
special- purpose infrastructure could  be  used  [4], 
[5], along  with techniques to deal  with  no honest 
beacons    [6].  We  remark  that  this  problem  is 
orthogonal to the problem of NPV.  In the rest of this  
project, we will assume that  devices  employ one of 
the techniques above to securely  determine their own 
position and  time  reference. 
Secure  neighbor discovery (SND)  deals   with  
the  identification  of  nodes    with    which    a  
communication link can  be established or that  are  
within a given  distance. SND is only a step  toward 
the solution we are after: simply put,  an  adversarial 
node  could  be  securely   discovered as neighbor  
and   be  indeed  a  neighbor  (within  some   SND 
range),  but  it could  still cheat  about  its position 
within the same  range.  
In other  words, SND  is a subset  of the  NPV 
problem, since it lets a node  assess whether another 
node  is an  actual   neighbor but  it  does  not  verify  
the  location   it claims  to  be  at.  SND  is  most  
often  employed to  counter wormhole attacks    [7], 
[8];  practical  solutions  to    the  SND  problem  have  
been  proposed  in  [9],  while    properties  of  SND 
protocols with proven secure solutions can be found 
in [10], [11]. 
Neighbor  position  identification  was   studied  
in   the context  of ad  hoc  and  sensor  networks; 
however,  existing  NPV    schemes  often    rely    on  
fixed  [12], [13] or  mobile  [14] trustworthy  nodes,   
which   are   assumed  to   be   always available for  
the   identification of  the   positions announced by  
third  parties. In  ad  hoc  environments, however, the 
pervasive  presence   of   either    infrastructure   or  
neighbor nodes  that  can be aprioristically trusted is 
quite  unrealistic. Thus, we devise  a protocol that is 
autonomous  and  does  not  require  trustworthy 
neighbors. 
In [15], an NPV protocol is proposed that  first 
lets nodes calculate distances to  all  neighbors, and  
then  commends that  all triplets of nodes  encircling 
a pair  of other  nodes  act as verifiers  of the pair’s 
positions. This scheme  does not rely on  trustworthy 
nodes,  but  it is designed for  static  sensor networks, 
and    requires  lengthy  multiround    computations 
involving several  nodes  that  seek consensus on a 
common  neighbor  identification.  Furthermore,  the   
resilience    of    the  protocol  in  [15]  to  colluding 
attackers has not been demonstrated.  The   scheme   
in   [16]  suits   static   sensor networks too,  and  it  
requires several   nodes   to  exchange information  
on  the   signal   emitted  by  the   node   whose 
location  has  to be verified. Moreover, it aims  at 
assessing not  the  position but  whether the  node  is  
within a   given region  or not. Our NPV solution, 
instead, allows  any  node to validate the position of 
all of its neighbors through a fast, one-time message 
exchange, which  makes it suitable to both static and 
mobile  environments.  Additionally,  we  show    that 
our   NPV   scheme   is   robust  against  several   
different colluding attacks.  Similar differences can 
be found between our  work  and  [17]. 
In  [18],  the  authors  propose  an  NPV  protocol 
that allows nodes  to  validate the  position of their  
neighbors through local  observations  only.   This  is  
performed    by    checking  whether  subsequent 
positions  announced  by  one    neighbor  draw  a 
movement over time that is physically possible. The 
approach  in  [18]  forces  a  node    to  collect  several  
data  on its neighbor  movements  before   a  decision  
can      be      taken,  making  the    solution  unfit    to 
situations  where  the    location  information  is  to  be 
obtained  and    verified  in  a  short    time  span.   
Moreover,  an  adversary  can  fool  the  protocol  by 
simply   announcing false  positions that  follow  a  
realistic mobility pattern. Conversely, by exploiting 
cooperation among nodes,  our  NPV protocol is 1) 
reactive,  as it can be executed at any instant by any 
node,  returning a result  in a short  time span,  and  
2)  robust  to  fake,  yet  realistic,    mobility  patterns 
announced by adversarial nodes  over  time. 
To our  knowledge, our  protocol is the first to 
provide a fully  distributed,  lightweight solution to 
the    NPV  problem  that    does    not    require  any  
infrastructure or a priori  trusted neighbors and  is 
robust  to  several    different  attacks,    including   
coordinated    attacks      by    colluding    adversaries.  
Also, unlike  previous works,  our solution is suitable 
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it  only  assumes RF communication. Indeed, non-RF 
communication,  e.g.,  infrared    or  ultrasound,  is 
unfeasible  in  mobile    networks,  where  non-line-of-
sight conditions are frequent and  device-to- device  
distances can be in the order  of tens  or hundreds of 
meters.  An  early  version of this  work,  sketching 
the    NPV  protocol  and  some  of  the  identification 
tests to detect independent adversaries, can be found 
in [19]. 
 
3.SYSTEM  AND ADVERSARY  
MODEL 
We consider a mobile  network and  define  as 
communication neighbors of  a  node  all  the  other  
nodes      that    it    can    reach  directly  with    its  
transmissions . We  assume that  each node  knows 
its own  position with  some  maximum error   p , and  
that  it shares  a common time  reference with  the  
other  nodes:    both  requirements  can  be  met  by 
equipping  communication    nodes      with      GPS  
receivers.   
 
Fig. 1. Message exchange overview, during  one  
instance of the  NPV protocol. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Example  of topological information stored by 
verifier S at the end of the  message exchange and  
effect  of a fake  position  announcement by M . 
 
nodes can perform Time-of-Flight-based RF ranging 
with  a maximum error  equal  to   r . As discussed in 
[15],  this    is  a  reasonable  assumption,  although  it 
requires  modifications  to  off-the-shelf  radio  
interfaces;    also,  promising  techniques  for  precise  
ToF-based  RF ranging have been developed [20]. 
We  assume  that  node  positions  do  not  vary  
significantly  during  a  protocol  execution,  since  a 
complete message exchange  takes   no  more   than   
a  few  hundreds of  milli- seconds.  The   relative   
spatial  movements  of    the      nodes  during  such    a 
period are  taken  into  account through the tolerance 
value   m . 
Nodes  carry  a  unique  identity2  and  can 
authenticate messages of other  nodes  through public  
key  cryptography.  In    particular,  we    assume  that  
each  node  X  owns  a private key,  kX , and  a 
public  key,  KX , as well  as a set  of one-time  use   
keys   {k0   ; K0  },  as   proposed  in   emerging 
 
 
architectures  for  secure  and  privacy-enhancing  
communication  [2].  Node      X    can    encrypt  and  
decrypt data with  its keys and  the public  keys of 
other  nodes;  also, it can produce digital  signatures 
(SigX ) with  its private key.  We assume  that   the   
binding  between  X   and   KX     can   be validated 
by  any  node,  as  in  state-of-the-art  secure 
communication architectures [2]. 
Nodes are correct if they comply  with  the NPV 
protocol, and  adversarial  if  they  deviate from  it.  
As    authentication  essentially  thwarts    external 
adversaries,  we    focus    on    the  more    powerful 
internal  ones,    i.e.,    nodes      that    possess      the 
cryptographic material to participate in the NPV and  
try to exploit  it,  by  advertising arbitrarily erroneous 
own  posi- tions  or inject misleading information. 
Internal adversaries cannot forge messages on behalf 
of other nodes whose keys they do not have. Thus, 
attacks against the cryptosystem are not considered, 
as correct implementation of cryptographic primitives 
makes them computationally infeasible. 
We  further  classify  adversaries  into:  
knowledgeable,  if  at  each  time  instant  they  know  
positions  and    (temporary)  identities  of  all  their 
communication  neighbors,  and  unknowledgeable, 
otherwise; independent, if they  act  indivi- dually, 
and  colluding, if they  coordinate their  actions. 
The protocol as well as the gist of its  resilience 
analysis.  Detailed  discussions  of  message  format, 
verification test is provided in Section 5. 
A verifier, S, can initiate the protocol at any time 
instant, by triggering the   4-step   message exchange 
depicted in Fig.  1,  within its 1-hop neighborhood.  
The aim   of the message exchange is to let S collect 
information it can use to compute distances between 
any pair of its communication neighbors. To that end, 
POLL and REPLY messages are first broadcasted by 
S  and   its  neighbors,  respectively. 
These  messages  are      anonymous    and      take   
advantage  of  the broadcast nature of the  wireless 
medium, allowing nodes to record reciprocal timing  
information  without  disclosing  their      identities.  
Then,   after   a  REVEAL  broadcast  by  the verifier,  
nodes  disclose  to S, through secure  and  authenti- 
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the anonymous timing  information they  collected.  
The verifier S uses  such  data  to match  timings and  
identities; then,  it uses   the   timings  to   perform  
ToF-based        ranging    and  compute    distances  
between  all  pairs   of  communicating 
 
4.COOPERATIVE NPV: AN 
OVERVIEW 
We  propose  a  fully  distributed  cooperative 
scheme for NPV, which enables a node, hereinafter 
called the verifier, to discover and verify the position 
of its communication neighbors. For clarity, here we 
summarize  the  principles  of  nodes  in  its 
neighborhood. 
Once  S  has  derived  such  distances,  it  runs   
several position verification tests in order to classify 
each candidate neighbor as either: 
1.  Verified, i.e., a node the verifier deems to be at 
the claimed position; 
2.   Faulty,   i.e., a node   the   verifier   deems  to   
have announced an incorrect position; 
3.  Unverifiable, i.e., a node the verifier cannot prove  
to be   either   correct   or   faulty,   due   to   
insufficient information. 
 
Clearly,  the  verification  tests  aim  at  avoiding  false 
negatives (i.e., adversaries announcing fake positions 
that are deemed verified)  and   false   positives  (i.e.,  
correct   nodes   whose positions are  deemed faulty),  
as well  as at minimizing the number of  unverifiable 
nodes.   We  remark that  our  NPV scheme  does not 
target    the  creation  of  a  consistent  “map”  of 
neighborhood  relations  throughout  an  ephemeral 
network:  rather,  it    allows    the    verifier    to  
independently classify  its neighbors. 
The    basic    principle  the    verification  tests    build  
upon is best explained by means of the example in 
Fig. 2. There,  M is a malicious node  announcing a 
false location  M 0 , so as to fraudulently gain  some  
advantage over  other  nodes.  The figure   portrays  
the  actual   network  topology with   black edges,  
while  the  modified topology, induced by  the  fake 
position  announced  by  M  ,  is  shown  with    gray  
edges.  It is evident that  the  displacement of M  to 
M 0    causes  its edges with  the  other  nodes  to 
rotate e.   The   tests   thus   look   for discrepancies in 
the  node  distance information to identify incorrect 
node  positions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Summary of Notations 
 
 
A malicious node,   knowing the   protocol,  can  try  
to outsmart the tests  in a number of different ways.  
Section 6 contains a comprehensive discussion of the 
protocol  resilience,  covering  conceivable  attack  
strategies  that  adver-  sarial    nodes    could    adopt. 
Overall,  our  analysis proves that: 
.  An  unknowledgeable  adversary  has  no 
possibility of success  against our  NPV protocol; 
.  An  independent  knowledgeable adversary  M  
can move at most two links (with the verifier S 
and  with  a  shared  neighbor  X)    without  being  
detected: how- ever,  any  additional link  (e.g., 
with    another  shared  neighbor  Y  )    leads     to  
inconsistencies  between  dis-  tances      and   
positions  that   allow   to   identify  the attacker: 
this    is  the  situation  depicted  in  Fig.  2.  In  a 
nutshell,  independent  adversaries,  although 
knowl- edgeable, cannot  harm  the system; 
.  Colluding  knowledgeable  adversaries  can 
announce timing   information that  reciprocally 
validate  their  distances,  and    pose    a  more  
dangerous  threat  to  the  system.  However,  we  
prove    that    an    overwhelming  presence  of 
colluders  in  the  verifier    neighborhood  is 
required  for  an  attack    to  be  successful. 
Additionally, simulations in  realistic  scenarios 
prove  the  robust- ness  of the  NPV protocol 
even    against  large    groups  of  colluding 
knowledgeable adversaries. 
 
5.NPV PROTOCOL 
We  detail    the  message  exchange  between  the 
verifier  and its communication neighbors, followed 
by a description of the tests  run  by the  verifier.  
Table 1 summarizes the  notations used  throughout 
the protocol description. 
 
 
 G. Satyachellayi Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                        www.ijera.com 
ISSN : 2248-9622, Vol. 4, Issue 8( Version 6), August 2014, pp.20-29 
  www.ijera.com                                                                                                                                24 | P a g e  
5.1    Protocol Message Exchange 
The  value  pX   is the  current position of X,  
and  INX   is the current set of its communication 
neighbors. We denote by tX   the   time   at   which   
a   node   X   starts   a   broadcast transmission and  
by tXY  the time  at which  a node  Y  starts receiving 
it. Note  that  these  time  values  refer  to the  actual 
instant  at  which    the  node    starts  
transmitting/receiving the first  bit  of  the  message 
at    the    physical  layer.    To    retrieve  the  exact 
transmission and reception time instants, avoiding the  
unpredictable  latencies      introduced  by    interrupts  
trig- gered  at the drivers level, a solution such as that 
implemented  in    is    required.3      Furthermore,  the  
GPS receiver  should be integrated in  the  802.11 
card;    software  defined  radio    solutions  combining 
GPS and  802.11 capabil- ities are proposed. 
Now, consider a verifier S that initiates the NPV 
protocol.  The  message  exchange  procedure  is 
outlined in Algorithm 1  for  S,  and   in  Algorithm  2  
for  any  of  S  s communication neighbors. 
 
Algorithm 1. Message  exchange protocol:  verifier. 
 
 
Algorithm2.  Message  exchange  protocol:  any 
neighbor. 
 
 
POLL message. The verifier  starts  the protocol 
by broadcasting a POLL  whose  transmission time  
tS  it stores locally  (Algorithm 1, lines  2-3). The  
POLL  is  anonymous, since 1) it does  not carry  the 
identity  of  the  verifier,    2)  it  is  transmitted  
employing a  fresh,  software-generated  MAC 
address, and  3) it contains a public  key K
0s taken  
from  S’s pool  of  anonymous  one-time use  keys  
that  do  not  allow neighbors to map  the  key  onto  a 
specific  node.  We stress that keeping the identity of 
the verifier  hidden is important in order  to make our 
NPV robust to attacks .  Since  a  source   address has  
to    be  included  in  the  MAC-layer  header  of  the 
message, a fresh, software-generated MAC  address 
is needed; note  that  this is considered a part  of 
emerging cooperative systems [2]. Including a  one-
time  key    in    the    POLL    also    ensures  that    the 
message is fresh  (i.e., the key acts as a nonce). 
3. This  leads  to  a  timing   precision of  around 23 
ns,  dictated by  the 44 MHz  clock  of  standard 
802.11a/b/g  cards.    As    mentioned  above,    we 
account for these  errors  through the   r  parameter. 
REPLY  message.  A  communication  neighbor  X 2 
INS that  receives  the  POLL  stores  its  reception 
time  tSX , and extracts  a random wait  interval TX  
2 ½0; Tmax   (Algorithm 2, lines  2-4). After  TX   
has  elapsed, X  broadcasts an  anon- ymous REPLY  
message using   a  fresh  MAC  address, and locally  
records its transmission time  tX  (Algorithm 2, lines 
5-9).    For      implementation    feasibility,      the   
physical  layer transmission time  cannot  be stamped 
on the  REPLY, but  it is  stored by  X  for  later  use.  
The  REPLY  contains  some information encrypted 
with S s public  key (K0  ), specifically the  POLL  
reception time  and  a  nonce   X   used  to  tie  the 
REPLY to the next message sent by X: we refer to 
these data as X’s commitment, Cj X  (Algorithm 2, 
line 7). The hash  hK0  , derived from  the  public   
key  of  the  verifier,   K0 ,  is  also included to  bind  
POLL  and  REPLY belonging to  the  same message 
exchange. 
Upon      reception    of    a    REPLY    from      a  
neighbor  X,  the verifier  S stores the reception time 
tXS and  the commitment Cj X  (Algorithm 1, lines 
4-5). When  a different neighbor of S, e.g., Y , Y  2 
INS  \ INX , broadcasts a REPLY too, X stores  the 
reception  time    tYX    and    the    commitment  Cj  Y    
(Algorithm 2, lines  10-11). Since REPLY messages 
are  anonymous,  a  node  records  all  commitments  it 
receives  without knowing their originators. 
REVEAL   message.  After   a  time   Tmax  þ   þ 
Tjitter ,  the verifier  broadcasts a REVEAL message 
using  its real  MAC address (Algorithm 1, line 6).      
accounts for the  propaga- tion  and  contention lag  
of  REPLY  messages scheduled at time  Tmax , and  
Tjitter   is  a  random time  added to  thwart jamming 
efforts on this message. The REVEAL contains:  1) a 
map  ImS , that  associates each  commitment Cj X  
received by the verifier to a temporary identifier iX  
(Algorithm 1, line 7); 
2) a proof  that  S is the author of the original 
POLL through the encrypted hash  Ek0  fhK0  g; 3) 
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certified   public   key  and   signature  (Algorithm 1,  
line  8). 
Note    that    using    certified    keys    curtails 
continuous attempts at  running  the   protocol  by  an  
adversary  who   aims   at learning neighbor positions 
(i.e., at  becoming knowledge- able) or at launching a 
clogging  attack  (see Section 6.4). 
REPORT message. Once the REPORT message 
is broad-cast and the identity of the verifier is known, 
each neighbor X that previously received S’s POLL 
unicasts to S an encrypted, signed REPORT message. 
The  REPORT  carries X’s position, the  transmission 
time    of  X’s  REPLY,  and    the  list    of    pairs    of  
reception times  and  temporary  identifiers referring  
to  the   REPLY  broadcasts  X   received  (Fig.  2, 
lines  12-14).  The  identifiers  are  obtained  from  the 
map ImS included in the REVEAL message. Also, X 
discloses    its  own  identity  by    including  in    the  
message its  digital  signature and  certified  public  
key;  through  the  nonce      X  ,  it  correlates  the 
REPORT  to  its  previously  issued  REPLY.  We 
remark that all sensitive data  are encrypted using  S s 
public    key,  KS  ,  so  that    eavesdropping  on  the 
wireless channel is not possible. At the  end  of the  
message  exchange,  only  the  verifier  knows  all 
positions and timing information. If needed, certified  
keys in REPORT messages allow  the  matching of 
such  data  and node  identities (temporary or long-
term, with the help of an authority if needed [2]). 
 
5.2    Position Verification 
Once  the  message exchange is  concluded, S  
can    decrypt  the    received  data    and    acquire  the  
position  of  all  neighbors  that    participated  in    the  
protocol, i.e., fpX ; 8X 2 INS g. The verifier  S also  
knows the  transmission time  tS  of its POLL and   
learns   that   of  all  subsequent  REPLY  messages,  
i.e., ftX ; 8X 2 INS gas well as the corresponding  
reception times recorded by  the  recipients of  such  
broadcasts,  i.e.,  ftXY;  8X;  Y    2  INS    [  fSgg. 
Applying a ToF-based  technique, S  thus   computes 
its  distance from  each  communication neighbor, as  
well  as  the  distances between all  neighbor pairs  
sharing a  link.  More  precisely, by  denoting with  c 
the speed  of light, the verifier  computes, for any 
communicating  pair   ðX; Y Þ   with   X; Y  2 INS  [ 
fSg,   two distances:  dXY  ¼ ðtXY    tX Þ c,  from   
the  timing   informa- tion   related  to  the   broadcast  
message  sent   by  X,  and dYX ¼ ðtYX    tY Þ c,  
from   the  information  related  to  the broadcast 
message by Y . 
Once such  distances have  been computed, S can 
run the following three verification tests  to  fill  the  
sets  IFS,  jVS,  and  UUS  with,  respectively,  faulty,  
verified and  unverifiable nodes. 
 
 
 
5.2.1   The Direct Symmetry Test  (DST) 
DST is the first verification performed by S and  
is detailed in  Algorithm  3.  There,   j j  denotes  the   
absolute    value  operator  and  kpX        pY  k    the  
euclidean  distance  between movements during  the   
protocol  execution.  The   second check verifies that 
the position advertised by the neighbor is consistent 
with  such  distances, within an  error  margin of 2 p 
þ  r (Algorithm 3, line 5). Although trivial, this check 
is  fundamental  since  it  correlates  positions  to 
computed  distances:  without  it,  an  attacker  could  
fool the  verifier  by simply  advertising an arbitrary 
position along  with  correct broadcast transmission 
and  reception timings. Finally, as a sanity   check,   S 
verifies   that   dSX    is  not   larger   than   R 
(Algorithm 3, line 6). The verifier  tags a neighbor as 
faulty  if a  mismatch is  found in  any  of  these  
checks,4    since    this  implies    an    inconsistency 
between  the    position  pX      and    the  timings 
announced by the neighbor (tSX , tX ) or recorded by 
the verifier  (tXS , tS ).  
 
Algorithm 3. Direct  Symmetry Test (DST) 
 
 
4. The latter  two checks are performed on both dSX   
and  dXS , however in Algorithm 3 they  are done  on 
dSX   only, for clarity  of presentation. 
 
6.   PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
We  evaluated  the  performance  of  our  NPV 
protocol in a vehicular scenario.  Results   obtained in   
a   pedestrian scenario are available as supplemental 
material,  which  can  be  found  on  the  Computer 
Society  Digital  Library  at  http://  doi.ieeecom 
putersociety.org/10.1109/TMC. 2011.258. 
We focus on knowledgeable adversaries whose 
goal  is  to  make  the  verifier  believe  their  fake 
positions,  and   we describe the best attack strategy 
they can adopt in Section 7.1. Such a strategy, will  
be    assumed  while  deriving  the  results  shown  in 
Section 7.2. 
The   results,   which   therefore  represent  a  
worst      case  analysis  of  the    proposed  NPV,    are  
shown  in  terms    of  the  probability  that    the    tests  
return false  positives and   false negatives as  well  as  
of  the  probability that  a  (correct  or adversary) 
node  is tagged as unverifiable. In addition, we plot  
the  average difference between the  true  position of 
a  successful  adversary  and    the    fake  position  it 
advertises, as well  as the  overhead introduced by G. Satyachellayi Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                        www.ijera.com 
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our  NPV  scheme.  The results on attacks  aimed at 
discrediting the position of other nodes  are  omitted, 
since  they  are  very  close  to  those  we present later  
in this  section. 
 
6.1 Results 
We  employed  movement  traces    representing 
vehicle    traffic  over  a  real-world  road    topology. 
More  precisely,  we  considered  car    movements 
within a 20 km2  portion of the Karlsruhe urban area  
depicted  in  Fig.  8,  extracting  3  hours  of  vehicular 
mobility  that    reproduce  mild    to  heavy    traffic 
density  conditions.  These    synthetic  traces    were  
generated  using    the    IDM-LC  model    of  the  
VanetMobiSim  simulator,  which      takes      into   
account  car-to-car   interactions,  traffic lights,  stop  
signs,  and  lane  changes, and  has  been  proven to  
realistically  reproduce    vehicular  movement  patters  
in urban scenarios [31]. 
In our   simulations,  we  set  Tmax  ¼ 200  ms, 
Tjitter    ¼  50  ms,  ¼  1  ms  and    assume  that  
CSMA/CA is used  to access the wireless  medium,  
hence   messages  can   be  lost   due   to collisions.  
Unless    otherwise  specified,  we  fix  the  proximity 
range,  R, which  is equal  to the maximum nominal 
transmis-  sion  range,    to  250  m  (resulting  in  an 
average neighborhood size  of  73.4  nodes),   while   
r ¼ 6:8 m,   p ¼ 10 m,  and   the tolerance value   m  
¼  5  m  (roughly  corresponding  to  the  case  of  two 
vehicles  moving at 50 km/h in opposite directions). 
To  evaluate  the  performance  of  our  NPV,  at 
every  simulation  second  we  randomly  select  1 
percent  of  the nodes  as verifiers.  Then, for each 
verifier, we compare the outcome of the verification 
tests  with  the  actual  nature  of the neighbors. We 
consider  colluding  adversaries  acting  in  groups, 
referred to as clusters. Note that a colluding cluster 
size  equal  to  1 corresponds to  independent attacks.  
Also,  adversaries  are  knowledgeable,  i.e.,  they 
perfectly  know  the  identity  and  location  of  all 
colluding and  noncolluding neighbors, and   always 
adopt  the  best  attack   strategy as 
 
 
described  in  Section  7.1.  In  the  following,  unless  
otherwise specified, adversaries amount  to  5 percent 
of  the  overall nodes  and  are divided into  clusters 
of five colluders each. 
In the legend of the plots, C stands for correct  
node    (e.g.,  the  label  “C  faulty”  refers  to  the 
probability of false positives), while M/Bas, M/Hyp, 
and  M/Col  stand  for  adversaries  launching,  
respectively, the basic, hyperbola-based and collinear 
attack (e.g., the label “M/Bas  verified” refers to the 
probability of false negatives due  to basic attacks). 
We    first    examine    the    NPV    protocol  
performance    for  different  values      of    colluding 
cluster  sizes  and  R ¼ 250 m (Figs. 9a and  9b). 
The false negative/positive probability in Fig. 9a 
clearly  shows  that1)  the  chance  of  wrong 
classification  reaches  0.01  only  for  a  very  large 
adversarial cluster size, namely 10, 2) the hyperbola-
based and   the  collinear attacks   are  the  most 
threatening and 3) an attack by the colluders is most 
effective in passing themselves off as verified when 
there  are at least three  of  them.  The  cluster   size  
also  affects  the  colluders ability  to  disrupt the  
positioning of correct  nodes,  which exhibit as high 
as a 0.4 percent chance to be tagged as faulty. 
Conversely, as  shown in  Fig.  9b,  the  cluster  
size  does not  cause  more  correct  nodes  to be 
unverifiable,  since    the  main    reason    for  correct  
nodes  to be tagged as unverifiable is the  lack  of 
noncollinear neighbors that  can  verify  them. The  
chance    for    an    adversary  to    be    unverifiable 
increases  with    the    cluster    size,  although  it  is 
significant only  in case of collinear attacks.  This is 
in agreement with  the fact that the  outcome of the  
collinear  attack    is  the    avoidance  of  a  sizable  
number  of  cross-checks  between  the  adversary  and 
correct      nodes,      thus      likely      leading    the   
adversary  to  be tagged as unverifiable. 
The  neighborhood  size  proves  to  play  an 
important role, as evident in Figs. 9c and 9d where 
we  consider  a  5-colluder  cluster  and  vary  the  
transmission range.  A small R (hence few neighbors) 
affects the NPV capability to correctly  tag a node.   
Widening  the   transmission  range   with   a  fixed 
colluding  cluster   size   significantly  favors   the   
verifier, allowing it to reach  a conclusive and  exact 
verdict  on  either  correct    or  adversary  nodes:    the 
larger  the R, the higher the number of cross-checks 
involving correct  nodes  in the CST. We note that, 
for transmission ranges larger  than  300 m, we obtain  
false positive/negative probabilities that  are smaller 
than   0.001.  Below   150-m   ranges  (corresponding  
to  an average neighborhood size of 12 nodes),  such  
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Fig. 9. Probability that a neighbor  is tagged 
incorrectly or as unverifiable, versus the colluder 
cluster size (a,b), and versus R (c,d). C: correct; 
M/Bas,/Hyp, and  M/Col: adversaries launching  the 
basic, hyperbola-based and  collinear attack,  each 
combined with the REPLY-disregard attack. 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.  Displacement gain  of adversaries running  a 
successful attack against the  NPV (a)  and  traffic 
load  induced  by  one  instance of the protocol (b). 
 
Fig. 11. Probability that a neighbor  is tagged incorrectly or as  unverifiable,  versus the ratio of adversaries 
(a,b),  and  position error (c,d). C: correct; M/Bas,  M/Hyp, and  M/Col: adversaries launching  the  basic, 
hyperbola-based, and  collinear attack,  each combined with the REPLY-disregard attack. 
 
Beside   the   impact  of  the   cluster   size   and   
of    the  transmission  range,    it  is  important  to 
understand  the  effect  of  the    percentage  of 
adversaries in the  vehicular network. Thus, in Fig. 
11a we fix R to 250 m and  the cluster  size to 5, and  
we  show  the  robustness of our  NPV  to the  density 
of adversaries: the  probability that   adversaries are  
verified  increases  ever    so    slightly    with    their  
density. The  highest effect is on the probability of 
correct    nodes    being    tagged  as  faulty,  which 
however reaches  its highest value (0.1) only for 30 
percent of adversaries in the network. A further effect 
of the growing presence of adversaries, as shown in 
Fig. 11b, is the unverifiable tag being slapped onto 
more correct nodes. A final observation can be made  
looking  at the false positive/negative probability as 
the  positioning  error    varies  (Figs.  11c  and    10d). 
Interestingly, for any  positioning error different from 
0, the metrics  are only marginally affected. 
Finally,    we    further  increase      the    level    of  
detail   of  our analysis and  study the  advantage 
obtained  by  adversaries  that    perform  a  successful 
attack    against  the    NPV    protocol.  Such    an  
adversarial gain  is expressed in  terms  of spatial 
displacement, i.e., difference of position between the  
real  and    fraudulently  advertised  locations    of  the 
successful attacker:  clearly,   a  larger   displacement  
range      implies      a  higher  freedom  of  movement, 
which,  in turn,  enables potentially  more   dangerous  
actions   against  the   system. The results in Fig. 11a 
are  broken  down  based    on  the  type  of  attack 
launched by the successful adversary, and are limited 
to  the  impact   of  the  transmission range,   since  
the    other  parameters  did  not  show    significant 
influence on the displacement of successful attackers. 
 
We    can    observe  that    successful  collinear  
attacks   yield small   advantage  for   adversaries,  
who   are   forced   to announce positions quite close 
to their real locations. Moreover, we recall that these  
attacks    constrain  adversaries  to  advertise  fake 
positions along  a precise  axis, thus  further limiting 
their  freedom of movement. We can conclude that 
collinear  attacks,    typically  those  with  the  highest 
chances  of success  as previously discussed, are also 
those    resulting  in  the    smallest    gain      for    the  
adversaries. Conversely, basic attacks   allow   the  
largest   average displacements, but  we showed that  
they  have  extremely low  success  probability. The  
hyperbola-based  attacks    appear  then    to    be    the  
most  dangerous  ones,  if  the  displacement  gain  is 
taken    into  consideration.  However,  such    a    gain  G. Satyachellayi Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                        www.ijera.com 
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becomes      significant  only  for  large  transmission 
ranges, in presence of which  we already observed 
that  the  actual  success  probability of the attacks  
becomes  negligible. 
Finally,    we  comment  on  the  overhead 
introduced by our scheme.   The   NPV   protocol  
generates    at      most      2n  þ  2  messages    for    one  
execution  initiated    by    a    verifier      with  n 
communication neighbors. Also, NPV messages are 
relatively small  in size:  with  SHA-1  hashing and  
ECDSA-160 encryption , the  length   of  signatures 
is    21    bytes  (with    coordinates  compression). 
Assuming  that    messages  include  headers  with    4-
byte source  and  destination identifiers  and   1-byte  
message    type      field,    POLL,    REPLY,  and  
REVEAL  are    26,  71,  and    67  bytes    in  size,  
respectively. The  REPORT  length   depends on  the  
quantity  of    common  neighbor  data    it  carries,  
amounting  to  4  bytes    per    shared  neighbor: 
information on more  than  360 neighbors can thus fit 
in a single  IP packet. 
Fig.  11b  portrays  the  traffic  induced  on  the 
network by one  instance of the  NPV  protocol. The  
plot    only    accounts  for    transmission    range   
variations  since,   once  more,   the other  parameters 
do  not  have  an  impact  on the  overhead. We  can  
observe that  security comes  at  a  cost,  since  the 
traffic load of the NPV protocol is higher than  that of 
a  basic  nonsecure  neighbor  position  discovery, 
consisting of only one  poll  and   associated position 
replies   from  neighbors. More  precisely, the  NPV  
protocol  overhead  is  comparable  to  that    of  the 
nonsecure discovery for smaller  transmission ranges, 
while   the  difference tends   to  increase   for  larger 
ranges.  However,  the  cost  of  the  NPV  protocol  is 
affordable in absolute terms,  since one run  requires 
just a few tens  of kbytes  to be exchanged among 
nodes,    even    in  presence  of  dense    networks  and  
large    transmission  ranges.  Note    that  the    results 
above  do  not  take  into  account the  overhead 
induced by the distribution of certificates, as it is out 
of the scope  of this  work  (the interested reader can 
refer  to [26]). 
Summary. Given   that   we  assumed  the  best   
possible conditions for the  adversaries, the  above  
results  prove    our  NPV  to  be  highly    resilient  to 
attacks.  Indeed, we observed typical   probabilities  
of  false   positives/negatives   below 
1 percent, while  that  of a node  being  tagged as 
unverifiable  is  below    5  percent.  Moreover,  we 
showed that  a significant portion of the  successful 
attacks  yields  small  advantage to the   adversaries  
in   terms   of  displacement.  Finally,   the overhead 
introduced by  the  NPV  protocol is  reasonable, as it 
does  not exceed  a few tens  of kbytes  even  in the 
most critical  conditions. 
 
7.CONCLUSION 
We  presented  a  distributed  solution  for  closest 
node  identification,  which    allows  any  node    in  a 
mobile  ad hoc network to verify  the position of its 
communication neighbors without relying  on a priori 
trustworthy nodes.  Our  analysis showed that  our  
protocol is very robust to attacks  by independent as 
well as colluding adversaries, even when they have  
perfect    knowledge  of  the  neighborhood  of    the  
verifier  with  the  concept  of  phantom  node,  closest 
node identification.  Simulation results  confirm that  
our    solution  is  effective    in  identifying  nodes  
advertising    false    positions,  while    keeping  the  
probability  of  false  positives  low.  Only  an 
overwhelming presence of colluding adversaries  in  
the   neighborhood  of  the   verifier,   or  the unlikely 
presence of fully collinear  network topologies, can 
degrade the effectiveness of our NPV. Here message 
can be broadcast to closest nodes. Future work  will 
aim at integrating the NPV protocol in higher layer 
protocols, as well  as at  extending it to a proactive 
paradigm,  useful    in  presence  of  applications  that  
need  each  node  to constantly verify  the position of 
its neighbors. 
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